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#SOWHITEMIALE: FEDERAL CIVIL RULEMAKING
Brooke D. Coleman
ABSTRACT-116 out of 136. That is the number of white men who
have served on the eighty-two-year-old committee responsible for creating
and maintaining the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The tiny number of
non-white, non-male committee members is disproportionate, even in the
context of the white-male-dominated legal profession. If the rules were
simply a technical set of instructions made by a neutral set of experts, then
perhaps these numbers might not be as disturbing. But that is not the case.
The Civil Rules embody normative judgments about the values that have
primacy in our civil justice system, and the rule-makers-while expert-are
not apolitical actors. This Essay argues that the homogeneous composition
of the Civil Rules Committee, not only historically, but also today, limits the
quality of the rules produced and perpetuates inequality. The remedy to this
problem is straightforward: appoint different people to the Committee. To be
sure, the federal civil rulemaking process is but one small part of where and
how gender and racial identity matter. Even still, this Essay argues that the
Civil Rules Committee members, the Judiciary, and the Bar should demand
that the civil rulemaking Committee cease being #SoWhiteMale.
AUTHOR-Associate Dean of Research & Faculty Development and
Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. I am grateful to Zachary
Clopton, Andrew Hammond, Elizabeth Porter, and Adam Steinman for their
comments. Thank you also to Evanie Parr for her fabulous research
assistance. This paper benefitted greatly from comments at the AALS 2018
Annual Meeting.
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INTRODUCTION
Of the 136 individuals who have served on the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee since its inception, 116 are white men, fifteen are white women,
and five are men of color.' Of the current fourteen members on the
Committee, nine are white men, four are white women, and one is a black
man.2 In other words, in the roughly eighty years of the Civil Rules
Committee's existence, the gender and racial identity of Committee
members has remained static.3 The Committee has been and remains
#SoWhiteMale.
One deflection of this critique is that the rules are too technical-too
boring, frankly-to be tainted by misogyny or racism. Courts and many
commentators, including the rule-makers themselves, argue that the
rulemaking process is technocratic; thus, it is ostensibly neutral and
apolitical. Indeed, a primary reason the Supreme Court delegated its
rulemaking authority to a committee was to ensure that litigation experts, not
1 See infra Graphs 1-3 and Tables 1-2.
2 U.S. COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, 9-12, (Apr. 2018),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04-civil-rules-agenda-book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/47VG-YDCY]. The author and her research assistant created a data set by compiling
the Committee membership and researching their race and gender. The set also collected data on the
Committee members' years of service, occupation, and geographic location. On the rare occasion where
the race of the Committee member could not be confirmed via research, the assumption was made that
the member was white. See Brooke D. Coleman, Civil Rules Committee Data Set (unpublished dataset,
on file with the Northwestern University Law Review).
3 The Civil Rules Committee was disbanded in 1956 and reconstituted in 1958. With those missing
two years, the Committee has existed for about 82 years in total. See infra notes 17-23 and accompanying
text.
4 Danya Shocair Reda, What Does it Mean to Say that Procedure is Political?, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
2203, 2207 (2017) ("The Committee is saddled with the burden of holding itself out as a body whose
decisions are apolitical. Indeed, the Committee's existence relies on the premise that it can engage in a
largely expert and technical task best left to the judiciary rather than the political branches. To the extent
that its decisions are understood to be political rather than 'procedural,' the legitimacy of its actions is
called into question.").
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Congress, would create and monitor the Civil Rules. Yet, as significant
scholarship in administrative law has revealed, when it comes to rulemaking,
there is no clean line between expertise and politics.6 Putting a group of
experts on a committee for a technical task does not mean the process and its
participants are immune from bias. To the contrary, ideology, politics, and
identity inform how the Civil Rules Committee members approach their
work.
Scholars have already considered how the rule-makers might be
influenced by their work experience,' political ideology, and litigation
attitudes.' This Essay considers the impact of the rule-makers' gender and
racial identities. It is the first to collect and quantify demographic data
regarding the gender and racial composition of the Committee members and
5 Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role
in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (1996) (noting that the Rules Enabling Act "envisioned
procedural rulemaking as an essentially technical undertaking best left in the expert hands of judges.").
6 See generally Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing A Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009) (arguing in the administrative agency context that a focus on expertise
to the exclusion of political influence misjudges the degree to which politics plays a role).
See, e.g., STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 77-82 (2017) (documenting the shift from
generalist practitioners to plaintiff or defense attorneys on the Committee); Brooke D. Coleman, One
Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1017 (2016) (discussing the increase of attorneys on the
Committee who specialize in complex litigation).
8 See, e.g., BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 7, at 82-90; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and
Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 613-17, 636-37 (2001)
(noting the conservative and defense orientation of rulemaking and recommending greater "socio-
political makeup"); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the
Politics ofRulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 798-99 (1991) (discussing the "politicization of the civil
rulemaking process").
See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees,
83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1086-87 (2015) (discussing the 2013 amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) and its anti-
plaintiff effects); Elizabeth Thornburg, Cognitive Bias, the "Band of Experts," and the Anti-Litigation
Narrative, 65 DEPAuL L. REV. 755, 767 (2016) (describing the Committee members as "operat[ing] in
the rarified world of complex litigation"-whether plaintiff or defense attorneys).
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the first to consider how that demographic data bears on Committee work. o
This Essay argues that the Committee's homogeneous racial and gender
composition is problematic."
First, the Committee members-while expert-are still human beings;
thus, the rule-makers' identities matter.12 Gender and racial identity do not
dictate ideology or normative values, but they certainly have influence. The
white male hegemony of civil rulemaking-operating in tandem within a
profession that has struggled to welcome women and people of color-has
almost certainly affected how the Civil Rules have developed and continue
to evolve. Social science regarding group dynamics and decision-making
indicates that the Committee's work would benefit from increased identity-
diverse Committee membership.13 Scholars have already argued that civil
rulemaking would improve if fewer judges and more "generalist" lawyers
served on the Committee because varied perspectives would improve the
quality of the rules produced.14 Similarly, a Committee with more men of
color and women of all colors would change and improve the Committee's
output as well.1 5
Second, the lack of gender and racial diversity on the Committee is
problematic because it is iniquitous. The history of the American legal
10 In 1996, the Administrative Office conducted a self-study to reflect on the Committee's
rulemaking activity. Of the hundreds of comments received, only one from a representative of the
American Bar Association noted the lack of women of all colors and men of color on the Committee. See
A SELF-STUDY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL RULEMAKING: A REPORT FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LONG
RANGE PLANNING TO THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND EVIDENCE OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 168 F.R.D. 679, 714-15 (1995) [hereinafter A SELF-
STUDY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL RULEMAKING]. Also, while Burbank and Farhang assessed the impact of
the race and gender of a federal judge's chances for gaining appointment to the Civil Rules Committee,
they did not assess the overall demographics of the Committee's membership over time. BURBANK &
FARHANG, supra note 7, at 82-90. Similarly, Dawn Chutkow's important work reviewing the Chief
Justice's appointments to all Judicial Conference committees focused on judicial appointments only.
Dawn M. Chutkow, The ChiefJustice as Executive: Judicial Conference Committee Appointments, 2 J.L.
& CTS. 2, 301-25 (2014). For an engaging discussion of race, gender, and other aspects of committee
composition at the state rulemaking level, see Zachary D. Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure,
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), available at
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3147280 [https://perma.cc/C47G-N76U].
This Essay tackles the Civil Rules Committee because it is the longest-standing rulemaking
committee, and it has the most direct influence over the federal civil justice system because it drafts and
amends the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the other committees responsible for federal rules
of practice and procedure-the Standing Committee, Appellate Rules Committee, Bankruptcy Rules
Committee, Criminal Rules Committee, and Evidence Rules Committee-are critical as well. The gender
and racial composition of those committees will be the subject of future work by the author.
12 See infra Section II.A.
13 See id.
14 See Coleman, supra note 7, at 1007-08; Thomburg, supra note 9, at 792.
15 The risk inherent in this argument is that it "essentializes" or stereotypes women and people of
color. Racial and/or gender identity cannot define individuals.
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system is one of exclusion.1 6 While many individual lawyers have carried
forward an ambitious social justice agenda, the profession itself has excluded
men of color and all women for centuries. Because of, and in spite of, that
history, legal institutions should endeavor to remedy that exclusion by
aggressively pursuing equalizing measures. This effort includes creating a
Civil Rules Committee that reflects the greater population.
The Essay will proceed in two parts. Part I presents data regarding
Committee membership over time. This Part compares the Committee's
gender and racial composition to both the general population and specific
segments of the legal profession. Part II then takes up the argument of why
identity matters. It argues that the rulemaking process would produce better
results if the Committee were more diverse. This Part also argues that putting
an end to a #SoWhiteMale rulemaking Committee would help break down
the inequalities entrenched in the legal profession and civil justice system.
I. FEDERAL CIVIL RULEMAKING & ITS COMMITTEE MEMBERS
The federal civil rulemaking process has been in place for roughly
eighty-two years. This next Section describes how that process has worked
and evolved over time. The process is not defined solely by its technical steps
and historical evolution, however. The racial and gender identity of the
people who make the rules also matters. This Section uses empirical data to
show that even though aspects of the rulemaking process have changed over
eighty years, the racial and gender composition of the Committee members
has remained largely the same.
A. BriefHistory ofFederal Civil Rulemaking
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not handed down from a
divine being. To the contrary, the Civil Rules have rather humble beginnings.
Following a protracted legislative battle," Congress passed the Rules
Enabling Act in 1934." Among other things, the Act authorized the Supreme
Court to promulgate lower court rules of practice and procedure." The Court
subsequently appointed a committee of experts to draft procedures for
16 See infra Section II.B.
17 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015
(1982) (providing the seminal historical account of The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and its adoption);
see also Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure ofFederal Civil Rulemaking,
39 N.M. L. REv. 261 (2009) (accounting the history of how the Rules Enabling Act was adopted and how
access to justice was an abiding concern informing its adoption).
18 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012); Burbank, supra note 17, at 1023.
19 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
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federal district courts. 20 The Committee members were fifteen accomplished
academics and litigators. 21 For four years the Committee rather quietly
drafted a set of rules, and in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
became the governing procedures for civil practice in federal district courts. 2 2
The Committee continues to manage the modem Civil Rules, but the
process has evolved over time to become multilayered. 23 The Civil Rules
Committee considers and studies proposals. 24 If adopted, a proposal is
forwarded to the Standing Committee on the Federal Rules of Practice and
Procedure for approval.25 Once approved, the rule amendment is published
for public comment. After the public process, the Civil Rules Committee
reconsiders the proposal in light of that feedback. 26 If it moves forward with
the proposal, the Standing Committee approves the rule once again and
forwards it on to the Judicial Conference of the United States. 27 Once the
Judicial Conference approves the rule amendment, it is sent to the United
States Supreme Court which-if it approves the rule-sends it on to
Congress.28 Congress then has seven months to alter or disapprove the rule.
If Congress fails to act by December 1, the rule becomes law.29
While still composed of federal litigation experts, the Committee's
composition has changed over time, much like the rulemaking process. First,
there are more judges and fewer academics on the Committee, flipping the
original composition of solely practitioners and professors.30 Second, the
20 The Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Committee in 1935, naming former Attorney General
William D. Mitchell as the Chair and then-Yale Law School Dean Charles E. Clark as the Reporter. Order
Appointing Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774, 774-75 (1934);
Paul V. Niemeyer, Revisiting the 1938 Rules Experiment, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 2157, 2161 (2014).
21 Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background ofthe 1938 Federal
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REv. 691, 710 (1998) (Committee composed of nine lawyers and five law
professors).
22 Id. at 729. The Advisory Committee sent its final draft to the Supreme Court in November 1937.
Id. From there, the Court made a few insignificant changes and "promulgated the Federal Rules on
December 20, 1937." Id. Congress took no action on the rules, and they went into effect on September
16, 1938. Id.
23 For a detailed history of the rulemaking process, see Burbank, supra note 17.
24 Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works/
overview-bench-bar-and-public [https://perma.cc/GEX4-XLGF].
25 Id.
26 Id
27 Id
28 Id
29 Id
30 Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An
Institutional Approach, 15 NEv. L.. 1559, 1565 (2015); Coleman, supra note 7, at 1017 ("The
[C]ommittee has profoundly changed between 1971 and the present day, withjudges taking up more seats
than practitioners and academics combined.").
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modem Committee's practitioners are steeped in high-stakes, complex
litigation while the original Committee's lawyers were what we might call
generalists.3 1 And finally, the Committee members are perceived to be-or,
according to some, are in fact-more ideologically motivated and
ideologically homogeneous than the original Committee members.3 2
B. #So WhiteMale: The Numbers
The Civil Rulemaking Committee consists of fifteen people, including
a chairperson, a reporter, and a member of the Department of Justice, most
often an Assistant Attorney General, who sits ex officio.3 3 The Committee
members-including the chairperson-are appointed for three-year terms
and generally do not serve more than two terms on the Committee.3 4 The
reporter's term on the Committee is unlimited. For this data set, I counted
only the voting Committee members, Committee chairs, and Committee
reporters because those Committee members are appointed by the Chief
31 Coleman, supra note 7, at 1018 ("[T]he practitioner profile has shifted from lawyers with a mix of
clients to lawyers that specialize in representing businesses or individuals, but rarely both. Plaintiffs'
lawyers on the early committee represented both individual and business interests, but the plaintiffs'
lawyers on the modem committee represent individuals or classes almost exclusively. On the other side,
the defense lawyers on the committee represent solely business interests."); Thomburg, supra note 9.
32 Moore, supra note 9, at 1087 ("Given the makeup of the Advisory Committee and the Standing
Committee, none of this is surprising. The members of both committees were all appointed by Chief
Justice John Roberts, and except for a few tokens, they are ideologically predisposed to think like
Federalist Society members, demographically predisposed to think like elite white males, or
experientially predisposed to think like corporate defense lawyers."); Stempel, supra note 8, at 637 ("On
a longer term, but perhaps more elusive level, policymakers should consider fine-tuning the generally
wise Rules Enabling Act process to ensure that the various committees are more evenly balanced in socio-
political makeup."). This has led many scholars to allege that rulemaking is in a state of "crisis." Richard
D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal JudicialRulemaking, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 447, 448 (2013)
("In 2013, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) turn seventy-five years old. Though the Rules
themselves have earned their encomia, the process by which they are promulgated under the Rules
Enabling Act (REA) has been a source of gloom for more than a generation.").
33 See U.S. COURTS, supra note 2.
34 Committee Membership Selection, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/committee-membership-selection
[https://perma.cc/Z4M4-9PNH]. Committee chairs are generally only appointed for one three-year term,
but exceptions can (and have been) made. Thus, a member may serve on a committee for a maximum of
six years. Chairs of the committees are normally appointed forjust one three-year term. Peter G. McCabe,
Renewal ofthe Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1666 (1995).
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Justice of the United States Supreme Court.3 5 The Committee has been in
place for eighty-two years from 1934-2018, taking a two-year hiatus from
1956-58. During that period and according to my data set, 136 individuals
served on the Committee. The Committee's composition by race and gender
is set forth in the graphs below.3 6
There are several caveats to this Essay's breakdown of the racial and
gender composition of the Committee. With respect to racial identity, I used
the United States Census Bureau racial designations. Yet, these designations
have shortcomings. "Race" as a formal category is complicated: by distilling
one's identity down to a single categorical description, the Census Bureau
oversimplifies personal identity and perpetuates categories that have their
origins in oppression and racism.3 7 While a full discussion of racial identity
is beyond the scope of this Essay, I would be remiss in failing to point out
this flaw in the dominant ways we think about and identify race. At the same
time, categorical labels are required to describe and define the lack of
diversity on the Committee (and beyond). To that end, I use the Census
Bureau's racial descriptors, but not without trepidation. 38
With respect to gender, the terminology refers to men and women. Like
racial identity, these terms are also problematic. First, they presume that
35 While the reporter does not vote, he is appointed by the Chief Justice to the Committee. Moreover,
his role is central to the process. The reporter is responsible for researching and presenting information
to the Committee, drafting proposed rule changes, reviewing and summarizing the public comments
regarding rule changes, and recording the Committee's work in minutes and reports. Committee
Membership Selection, supra note 34. The DOJ representative votes but he or she sits by designation on
the Committee and is appointed by the President, not the Chief Justice. See Lori Atherton, ChadReadler,
'97, Appointed Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice Civil Division, MLAW
NEWSROOM, https://www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/features/Pages/ChadReadler 050917.aspx
[https://perma.cc/B35N-6NA8] ("Readler was appointed January 30 by President Donald Trump.");
COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE MEMBERSHIP 2 (2017),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017_committee_roster.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYX4-
LWYC].
36 Brooke D. Coleman, Civil Rules Committee Data Set (unpublished dataset, on file with the
Northwestern University Law Review)..
37 Janet E. Helms, Introduction: Review of Racial Identity Terminology, in BLACK AND WHITE
RACIAL IDENTITY: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 3 (Janet E. Helms ed., 1990) (stating that "the
term 'racial identity' actually refers to a sense of group or collective identity based on one's perception
that he or she shares a common racial heritage with a particular racial group.").
38 See Kenneth Prewitt, Fix the Census' Archaic Racial Categories, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/opinion/fix-the-census-archaic-racial-categories.html
[https://perma.cc/E96L-863E] (critiquing the current designations and calling for a new approach to
collecting census data).
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gender is binary, a social construct that has been roundly discounted.39
Second, the term woman/women does not properly account for the
intersectionality that differently impacts women of different races, sexual
orientation, class, or other factors. When women are presented as a
monolithic group, the experience of women with intersectional identities
becomes invisible.40 Where possible-and where the statistics are
available-this Essay will present information about women divided at the
very least along racial lines. As with the racial identity caveat above,
however, in presenting the stark contrast of the number of men who have
served on the Committee versus women, this Essay uses the term
woman/women as a default descriptor.41
Of the 136 individuals who have served on the Committee, 116 are
white men, fifteen are white women, four are black men, and one is a
Latino/Hispanic man. Graphic illustrations of this composition are available
below.
39 Doug Werth, Because of Sex: Gender Identity and Transgender Rights Under Titles VII and IX,
ADVOCATE, May 2017, at 32, 32 ("[A] binary approach [to gender] fails to account for other factors that
may contribute to define a person's sex, such as chromosomal mutations, hormonal differences and
gender identity. In some instances, the assignment of sex at birth based upon visual examination of
external genitalia may not reflect a person's gender.").
40 Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L.REV. 1241, 1242-44 (1991) (describing the intersectional location
of women of color and their marginalization within feminist discourse); Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (discussing the need for the
feminist movement to engage and embrace intersectional identities).
41 In addition, while beyond the scope of this Essay, there are additional meaningful inquiries that
could be made into the Committee's composition such as sexual orientation and disability status. See,
e.g., Kathleen Dillon Narko, "Inclusion Means Including Us, Too": Disability and Diversity in Law
Schools, FED. LAW., January/February 2017, at 22, 23 ("This article will explore why disability should be
included in ideas of diversity and inclusion as well as the barriers people with disabilities face. I focus on
those preparing to enter the legal profession-law students."); Sharon E. Rush, Federalism, Diversity,
Equality, and Article III Judges: Geography, Identity, and Bias, 79 MO. L. REV. 119, 121-22 (2014)
(examining geographic identity and its impact on judging with experiential bias).
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GRAPH 3: COMMITTEE COMPOSITION BY RACE & GENDER 1934-2018
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As the graphs show, the Committee's gender composition is 89% men
and 11% women. In terms of race and gender, the historical composition of
the Committee is 85% white men, 3% black men, 0.7% Latino/Hispanic
men, and 11% white women. No women of color have ever served on the
Committee, and only five men of color have served-four black men and
one Latino/Hispanic man.
William Thaddeus Coleman, Jr. was the first person of color appointed
to the Committee in 1965.42 The next person of color was not appointed until
over thirty years later in 1998 when Myles Lynk (Arizona State University)
joined the Committee.4 3 Since then, Judge Jose Cabranes (U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit) was appointed in 2004, Judge Solomon
Oliver, Jr. (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio) was
appointed in 2011, and Professor Benjamin Spencer (University of Virginia)
was appointed in 2017.44 To put it differently, in the past thirty years, only
one man of color has been appointed to the Committee per decade.
The first woman appointed to the Committee was Judge Shirley M.
Hufstedler (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit) in 197 1.45 The next
women were appointed in 1985: attorney Larrine Holbrooke and Judge
Mariana R. Pfaelzer (U.S. District Court for the Central District California).4 6
42 See Brooke D. Coleman, Civil Rules Committee Data Set (unpublished dataset, on file with the
Northwestern University Law Review).
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 See id.
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Attorney Carol Fines4 7 was appointed in 1991 after Holbrooke and Pfaelzer
cycled off the Committee.4 8 Christine Durham, ajudge on the Supreme Court
of Utah, was appointed in 1995 to serve during Fines' final two years on the
Committee.4 9 In 1997, Judge Lee Rosenthal (U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas) was appointed to the Committee, followed by
Sheila Birnbaum (partner, Quinn Emmanuel Urquart & Sullivan) and Judge
Shira Scheindlin (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York)
in 1998.50 This was the first time in the Committee's history that more than
two women served on the Committee at one time.
In 2004, Chilton Varner (partner, King & Spaulding) was added to the
Committee, overlapping with Judge Scheindlin for one year and with Judge
Rosenthal for three, maintaining the female membership of the Committee
at three until Judge Scheindlin cycled off the Committee in 2006.5' From
2011-14, female membership remained at two with Judge Gene Pratter (U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania) and Elizabeth
Cabraser (partner, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP) serving
during that time.5 2 Virginia Seitz (partner, Sidley & Austin, LLP) joined the
Committee in 2014 raising the number of women back up to three. 53 Since
2015, the female membership of the Committee has increased to four with
Seitz, Cabraser, Judge Sara Lioi (U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio), and Judge Joan Ericksen (U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota) serving from 2015-16 and Seitz, Ericksen, Lioi, and Ariana
Tadler (partner, Milberg LLP) serving from 2017 to present.5 4
Not one woman of color has ever been appointed to the Committee.
Every single one of the fifteen women who has served on the Committee is
white.
Graphs 4 and 5 below show the composition of the Committee broken
down first by race and then by gender from decade to decade. As these graphs
show, no people of color have served on the Committee during the four
decades of the Committee's existence. In the remaining five decades, people
47 Carol Fines was also listed as Carol Posegate in rulemaking records. See id.
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 Judge Rosenthal was elevated to Chair of the Civil Rules Committee from 2003-07 and then to
Chair of the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure from 2007-14. Richard Ellison, Judicial
Profile: Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, U.S. District Judge, Southern District ofTexas, FED. LAW., July 2008, at
22, 22-23.
52 See Brooke D. Coleman, Civil Rules Committee Data Set (unpublished dataset, on file with the
Northwestern University Law Review).
53 See id.
54 See id.
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of color have served in severely disproportionate numbers compared to white
individuals. Similarly, women did not serve on the Committee for the first
four decades of its existence. For the remaining five decades, women have
had greater representation than men and women of color (especially the
latter, given that no women of color have been appointed to the Committee),
but their representation still falls far short of equipoise.
GRAPH 4: COMMITTEE RACIAL COMPOSITION BY DECADE
N N
~
N,V
½' nl-
Whlite People w People of Color
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GRAPH 5: COMMITTEE GENDER COMPOSITION BY DECADE
To further put these stark numbers into context, Table 1 compares the
racial composition of the Committee to the racial composition of the United
States as reported by the Census Bureau (as of July 2017)," followed by the
racial composition of lawyers and federal district court judges in the United
States. The pool of candidates for Committee positions largely consist of
federal district court judges and practicing lawyers; thus, the Table below
focuses further on those two categories.5 6
-3
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55 Quick Facts: United States, THE UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217#qf-headnote-b [https://perma.cc/C3EJ-GQMK].
56 Federal district court judges make up most of the Committee-currently holding six of the
Committee positions. See U.S. COURTS, supra note 2. While one state court judge and one federal
appellate judge serve on the Committee as well, most of the judges are from the federal district court.
Following judges, the next largest category of Committee members are lawyers-currently four serve on
the Committee. See id. While academics serve on the Committee, they hold only two positions-one as
reporter and one as a Committee member. See id.
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TABLE 1: COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP: RACIAL IDENTITY COMPARED TO GENERAL POPULATION,
LAW PRACTICE POPULATION, & JUDICIARY
FederalCommittee Current U.S. Legal District
Race Membership Committee Population Practice Court
(1934-2018) Membership (Census) Judges
White(non- 96% 93% 60.7% 85.5% 71%
Latino/Hispanic)
Latino/Hispanic 0.7% 0% 18.1% 5.1% 10%
Black/African 2.9% 7% 13.4% 4.6% 14%
American
American Indian or 0.0% 0% 1.3%
Alaska Native
Asian 0.0% 0% 5.8% 4.8% 3%
Native Hawaiian or 0.0% 0% 0.2% ** **
Other Pacific Islander
Table 1 shows
both over time and
that white men are overrepresented on the Committee
currently. This is true with respect to every metric-
general population, legal practice, and federal district court judges.
Conversely, every racial designation is underrepresented on the Committee
on every count. For example, while Latino/Hispanic individuals hold 10%
of federal district court judgeships and make up about 5% of the Bar, they
have made up less than 1% of the Committee over time and hold zero seats
on the Committee currently. The story is roughly the same for other people
of color. For instance, while black individuals hold 14% of federal district
court judgeships, there is not one black federal judge serving on the
Committee. The only person of color serving on the Committee currently is
a law professor who was recently appointed in 2017. Indeed, white men-
both historically and currently-dominate the Committee's composition.
57 INSTITUTE FOR INCLUSION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, IILP REVIEW 2017: THE STATE OF
DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 18 (2017), http://www.theiilp.com/resources/
Pictures/IILP_2016_FinalLowRes.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LMQ-GCQ4] [hereinafter IILP REVIEW
2017]. These numbers reflect data for 2015.
58 Percentage ofActive U.S. District Court Judges as ofAugust 2017, by Race and Hispanic Origin,
STATISTICA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/408483/percentage-of-us-district-court-judges-by-race/
[https://perma.cc/N6NJ-MPPS]. The categories are slightly different than what is presented in this table
because the statistics account for "multi-racial" judges, with 8% of federal district court judges falling
into that category. The data provided in the IILP Review 2017 did not break down percentages in these
two categories.
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Gender composition of the Committee is no different. Like the previous
Table, Table 2 compares the gender composition of the Committee to the
gender composition of the general population, legal practice, and federal
district courts.
TABLE 2: COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP: GENDER IDENTITY COMPARED TO GENERAL POPULATION,
LAW PRACTICE POPULATION, & JUDICIARY
Committee Current U.S. Federal
Legal
Gender Membership Committee Population 60 District Court
(1943-2018) Membership (Census)5 9  Judges61
Male 1 89% 72% 1 49.2% 1 64% 1 66%
Female 11% 28% 50.8% 36% 34%
Table 2 demonstrates similar trends based on gender. Women hold 34%
of federal district court judgeships and make up 36% of practicing lawyers,
yet they have held only 11% of the Committee seats over time and hold only
28% currently. The latter number is more promising. In the past few years,
four women have served on the Committee, making up 28% of its
composition. This is certainly progress, but again, these women are all white.
No woman of color has ever been appointed to the Committee even though
women of color hold 11. 9% of federal judgeships6 2 and make up 1 4 .5% of
practicing lawyers.63
The homogeneity of the Committee membership is notable, but it is
even more prominent when looking at Committee leadership. The two key
roles on the Committee are the chair and the reporter. The chair is the leader
of the Committee and in recent history is the person who serves as Standing
Committee Chair once his or her service as the civil rules chair has ended.
The reporter is the academic Committee member who is paid a small sum to
be the scribe and researcher for the Committee. The reporter often provides
the first draft of the proposed amendments, summarizes public comments,
and provides and organizes additional research that the Committee might
request.
5 Quick Facts: United States, supra note 55.
60 IILP REVIEW 2017, supra note 57, at 18.
61 BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RES. SERV., U.S. CIRCUIT & DISTRICT COURT JUDGES: PROFILE OF
SELECT CHARACTERISTICS 15 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43426.pdf [https://perma.cc/GHM3 -
D3SH].
62 Id. at 20 fig.12.
63 IILP REVIEW 2017, supra note 57, at 18. This percentage is for the year 2015.
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The identity make-up of these two important positions-like the
Committee membership itself-has remained static. All but one of the fifteen
Committee chairs-Judge Lee Rosenthal, a white woman-have been white
men. And, every single one of the nine reporters has been a white man.6 4 In
other words, like the Committee's membership, the Committee's leadership
is #SoWhiteMale.
II. IDENTITY MATTERS
The identity of the Rulemaking Committee is homogeneous-that
much is clear. The question is whether that homogeneity should matter. After
all, some would argue the rules are technical and the process neutral, so why
does it matter whether the Committee membership is diverse or not? In this
Part, this Essay argues that even in the context of an expert-driven technical
process, identity matters. The Committee members are susceptible to bias,
and one way to mitigate that inevitable bias is to diversify the Committee
membership, resulting in a rulemaking process that can help identify and
overcome biases that may limit decision-making as well as create rules that
incorporate diverse perspectives.
In addition to making the pragmatic case for why identity matters, this
Part also argues that stakeholders are duty-bound to ensure the Committee is
more representative. The historical and current exclusion and
underrepresentation of men of color and women of all colors in the legal
profession can only be remedied through thoughtful leadership and action.
A. Identity, Decision-Making, & Federal Civil Rulemaking
Identity matters in the context of federal civil rulemaking. First, some
Committee members assert that the Committee is an apolitical body
68
64 There have been eight Committee reporters, but Richard Marcus has recently served as an associate
reporter to Ed Cooper on the Committee. Thus, he is included in the total number of reporters as he likely
stands to become the official reporter when Cooper retires. See COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE MEMBERSHIP, supra note 35, at 1 (listing Richard Marcus as Associate Reporter).
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engaging in neutral, expert-driven work.6 5 That is simply not the case. The
Committee is not political in the traditional sense because the members are
not elected, but instead appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Yet, the members are subject to the same biases and preferences to which we
all succumb. Second, those biases cannot be eliminated, but they can be
mollified by a more diverse Committee membership. Finally, the
Committee's product-the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-would benefit
from a heterogeneous rulemaking body that can better identify implicit
biases and incorporate diverse members' unique insights and perspectives
into the rules.
Kathryn Watts has effectively argued that in an expert-driven context
like administrative regulatory rulemaking, ideological politics inevitably
play a role and thus should be explicitly considered.6 6 In that context, the
President is an elected official with a clear political agenda he or she hopes
to implement. In civil rulemaking, pure politics are not nearly as front and
center. The Chief Justice, an unelected member of the Judicial Branch,
appoints the Committee members, many of whom are judges themselves
whose day job is based on their ability to be neutral and objective.
An important distinction between Watts's thesis and the federal
rulemaking process is that the unelected head of the judiciary appoints the
rulemaking Committee members; yet, there are still important connections
to be made with her scholarship. First, while experts may try to approach
rulemaking with a neutral perspective, they are still human beings and are
65 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act,
1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 301-02 (as a former committee reporter, Carrington lauded the Committee's work
because it allowed for an "apolitical approach to matters of procedure," as it did not allow "groups ...
such as 'repeat players' and the organized bar [to] exercise disproportionate influence on the process"
and protects the interests of the "disorganized (and hence powerless)."); Freer, supra note 32, at 467
("And despite the politicization, one insider reports that the Committee hearings and conferences are
'relatively apolitical' and 'probably come a good deal closer to a seminar than many hearings in
Congress.'"); Mullenix, supra note 8, at 842 ("On the contrary, traditionalists hold paramount the
principles of trans-substantive rules, a belief that compels an apolitical process conducted by expert elites
operating with relative immunity from partisan pressures."); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the
Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery "Reform", 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
197, 198 (2001) ("Rulemaking is viewed on the one hand as an apolitical procedure and on the other hand
as a 'disguised outcry for tort reform.').
66 Watts, supra note 6, at 8-9.
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subject to the same cognitive biases as anyone else.67 Second, while not
elected, the Committee members come to the table with experiences that
inform how they view the world, and more narrowly, civil litigation.68
Finally, the rulemaking process cannot be neutral because the rules are not
neutral. While cast as a technical set of prescriptions for how to litigate a
case in federal court, they are a set of normative judgments about how to
balance competing values in our civil justice system. Rule-makers, like
judges, believe in their objectivity, but as Danya Reda has argued, when it
comes to the Civil Rules, much like judging, "We are not dealing with 'fact'
but with policy or normative judgment."69 Because of the inherently
subjective salience of the work the Committee is doing, stakeholders
rightfully care about the identities of the individuals who make the rules.
Almost every rule amendment reflects the Committee members'
normative judgment about what litigation values should be elevated. For
example, the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 provided for mandatory
sanctions. 70 That choice-to harden the sanction rule-was not simply a
technical tweak. It was a choice reflecting the Committee members'
normative judgment that the civil justice system would be better served if
more frivolous claims were filtered out earlier That judgment did not stand
alone, however. It necessarily subordinated other value judgments such as
the loss of more meritorious claims (that might be filtered out wrongly under
such a high standard) and the potential chilling effect (that some meritorious
claims might not be brought because of the fear of the high standard and its
consequences).72
The recent proportionality amendments are similarly value-laden. Rule
26(b)(1) was amended in 2015 to further restrict the scope of discovery to
67 Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework ofFunction(s) and
Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1983, 2013 (2013) ("The impact of these cognitive biases reaches beyond
the general public, affecting the conduct of agencies as well."); Stephen Gilles, What's So Great About
Lay Judgments? What's So BadAbout Expertise?, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 500 (1997) ("Cognitive
psychologists have reported that both laypeople and experts often suffer from cognitive biases of various
kinds."); Watts, supra note 6, at 33 ("[A]llowing agencies to unapologetically disclose political influences
and enabling courts to credit openly political judgments would help to bring hard look review, which
currently hinges on an outmoded model of 'expert' decisionmaking, into harmony with other major
administrative law doctrines that embrace the more current 'political control' model.").
68 Coleman, supra note 7, 1016-19.
69 Reda, supra note 4, at 2223.
70 See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at 11: A Commentary on the Supreme
Court's 1993 Amendment to Rule II of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 93,
100-01 (1993) (discussing the evolution of Rule 11).
71 Id.
72 Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1817 (2015) (noting that Rule
11 reflected the Committee's shift in values from "one of receptivity to the potential for a meritorious
claim to suspicion that more claims are now frivolous").
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require that it be "proportional to the needs of the case."7 3 This rule
amendment reflects a normative judgment that discovery must be highly
monitored and restricted in order to avoid unnecessary "costs and delay." 74
Again, the amendment was not the mere fine-tuning of a rule. In contrast to
previous Committee members' value judgments that discovery should be
expansive (even at the expense of some delay), the current Committee
members decided to give primacy to theirjudgment that restrictive discovery
is better for the civil justice system-even if that means that some plaintiffs
with valid claims will be unable to get the information they need to win their
cases.75
In addition, the Committee is a deliberative body that depends on
thoughtful consideration by its members. Social science studies repeatedly
demonstrate that diverse perspectives in decision-making bodies improve the
product. With respect to racial and gender diversity, studies demonstrate that
decisions are more accurate when made by a heterogeneous group versus a
homogeneous one. For example, a recent study of jury deliberations
determined that the ethnically diverse group ofjurors was significantly more
likely than the all-white group ofjurors to notice missing evidence, ask better
questions, and make accurate decisions. 76 While some studies have shown
that heterogeneous group composition in decision-making is not always a net
benefit because of inter-group conflict,77 that problem does not apply to all
73 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). The rule now includes the following six factors: (1) "whether the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit;" (2) "the amount in controversy"; (3)
"the parties' resources"; (4) "the importance of the issues at stake"; (5) "the importance of the discovery
in resolving the issues"; and (6) "the parties' relative access to relevant information." Id. The first five
factors were previously located in Rule 26(b)(2)(C), and the sixth was added through the amendment
process. U.S. COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, 80-81, (Apr. 2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr import/CV2014-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/GXS9-RQ4K].
74 Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and
Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2012) (arguing that the cost-and-delay narrative persists even
when argued that "[d]ecades of empirical work ... support[] the view that the federal civil system is
highly effective in most cases, that total costs develop in line with stakes, and that discovery volume and
cost is proportional to the amount at stake.").
7 Coleman, supra note 72, at 1811-15.
76 Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple
Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 605-06
(2006).
See, e.g., Karen A. Jehn et al., Why Differences Make a Difference: A Field Study of Diversity,
Conflict, and Performance in Workgroups, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 741, 741-42 (1999); Eden B. King et al.,
Conflict and Cooperation in Diverse Workgroups, 65 J. Soc. ISSUES 261, 267-68 (2009); Elizabeth
Mannix & Margaret A. Neale, What Differences Make a Difference?: The Promise and Reality of Diverse
Teams in Organizations, 6 PSYCHOL. SC. PUB. INT. 31, 41-42 (2005). This has led some scholars to argue
in favor of cognitive diversity. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 120 (2015) (arguing for the elevation of "cognitive diversity"). As I have argued
previously, cognitive diversity is valuable, but it should not supplant identity diversity. Brooke D.
Coleman, A Legal Fempire?: Women in Complex Civil Litigation, IND. L. J. (forthcoming 2018)
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groups and all forms of decision-making. The context of the decision-making
is what matters, because where decision-making requires a rigorous
consideration of facts with a goal of accuracy, diversity is a benefit. That is
because it creates what researchers call "friction."" Friction "can increase
conflict in some group settings," but it can also inspire group members to
ask better questions, think more deeply about problems, and actively
participate in the proceedings." According to researchers, for this kind of
decision-making, "vigilant skepticism is beneficial; overreliance on others'
decisions is risky." 0
In other words, in a context like federal civil rulemaking, diverse
decision-making bodies are "smarter."" When people work with individuals
who are different from them, they tend to ask better questions and think
harder about issues.82 Heterogeneity in group decision-making may not lead
to a smooth, conflict-free decision-making process, but it will lead group
members to "sharpen" their thinking and make better decisions.83
Finally, there are instances where one can imagine that a more
representative rulemaking body might have produced a different, and
perhaps better, rule. For example, when the modem class action rule (Rule
23) was adopted in 1966, the Committee was an all-white-male body.84 Rule
23(b)(2), the class action injunction rule, was adopted in response to the
school desegregation cases of the 1950s and 1960s. As David Marcus has
shown in his seminal historical work on the adoption of the modern class
action rule, the Committee was obsessed with providing courts with a tool to
("While cognitive diversity might have a place in this important discussion, it should not obscure and
cannot solve the problem that power in the legal profession-and society more generally-is distributed
in a way that aligns closely with gender and racial inequality that were the deliberate products of the
American legal system. Identity politics are currently out of favor, but discrimination based on identity
persists.").
78 Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles, 11I PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC.
18524, 18525 (2014).
Id.
80 Id.
David Rock & Heidi Grant, Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 4, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/1 I/why-diverse-teams-are-smarter [https://perma.cc/59GZ-N6P9].
82 Id
83 Id
84 David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern
Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 709 (2011) ("The men who revised Rule 23 were well-meaning white
elites who may have underappreciated some of the complexities of desegregation in their zeal for the
cause."); see also Brooke D. Coleman, Civil Rules Committee Data Set (unpublished dataset, on file with
the Northwestern University Law Review).
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desegregate schools through injunctive structural reform. 5 Benjamin Kaplan
and Albert Sacks, the committee members who spearheaded the adoption of
Rule 23(b)(2), were both active in the civil rights movements, and the
remaining Committee members, while white, male, and elite, were
exceedingly progressive.8 6 As Marcus notes, Rule 23(b)(2) was a "noble"
effort; the Committee designed a procedural tool to eradicate a systemic
wrong. 87
Imagine if a historically marginalized person like a woman or a man of
color served on the Committee-one perhaps steeped in the challenges for
women in the workplace who considered the possibility for future structural
reform via Title VII. Would the rule have developed differently if the
Committee members had considered other types of institutional reform
litigation, like gender discrimination or sexual harassment? For example,
might Rule 23(b)(2) have expressly allowed for the recovery of certain kinds
of monetary relief, like backpay, along with the injunctive relief? The Court
had the opportunity to resolve this issue left open by the rule's plain language
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes." The Court held that the individualized
backpay sought in Dukes was not permitted in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action.
It left the door open, however, to other monetary damages that might be
construed as incidental and thus potentially available in gender
discrimination and other Rule 23(b)(2) class actions.0 A rule that specifically
allowed for this relief and anticipated future structural reform would have
put this question to bed entirely. In other words, were the all-white-male
Committee members blind to the other goals that Rule 23(b)(2) may have
achieved, and if so, could members with more diverse identities have
developed a rule that accommodated these other remedies to more effectively
promote institutional reform? It is at least possible that a Committee with
different membership would have produced an even "nobler" rule.
85 Marcus, supra note 84, at 697 ("The 'classic example' of a class action generating a broadly
preclusive judgment regardless of category of right, Kaplan continued, is 'of course the desegregation
cases."').
86 Id. at 702-05.
87Id. at 660-61.
88 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2016) ("Our opinion in Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown ... expressed serious
doubt about whether claims for monetary relief may be certified under that provision. We now hold that
they may not, at least where (as here) the monetary relief is not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory
relief.").
89 Id.
90 Megan E. Barriger, Comment, Due Process Limitations on Rule 23(b)(2) Monetary Remedies:
Examining the Source of the Limitation in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 619,
620 (2012) (noting that the elimination of the recovery of backpay in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action "would
create an enormous roadblock to Title VII employment discrimination claims, which have historically
been brought under Rule 23(b)(2) and have also included awards for backpay.").
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In sum, the federal civil rulemaking process relies on expertise, and
rightfully so. Yet, that expertise does not eliminate the potential for bias in
decision-making. A Committee that is more representative of men of color
and women of all colors would not only mitigate these biases, but would also
likely produce rules that reflect a variety of diverse perspectives and consider
issues that other members may have overlooked.
B. Morality ofInclusion Because of a History ofExclusion
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Hanna v. Plumer-the seminal 1965
Erie doctrine case substantiating the validity of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-found the integrity of the Rules to be "absolute" because they
were created by "the members of the Advisory Committee, the Judicial
Conference, and this Court," who Harlan noted were "presumably
reasonable men."" Harlan was not being politically insensitive; he was
stating pure fact. Each institutional body Harlan referenced was comprised
mostly of white men. Stated differently, for much of our nation's history and
for much of the history of the legal profession, men of color and women of
all colors have been regularly and systematically excluded.92
This history of exclusion in the legal profession is an important reason
to pursue greater diversity on the Civil Rules Committee. As a body that
represents the most elite members of the legal community, the Committee
should endeavor to actively right the wrongs of this past and take action.93
The Chief Justice must prioritize appointing more men of color and women
91 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965).
92 Troy J.H. Andrade, Ke Kanwai Mamalahoe: Equality in Our Splintered Profession, 33 U. HAW.
L. REV. 249, 257 (2010) ("The legal profession's history can be characterized as one of discrete and
sometimes outright exclusion."); Helia Garrido Hull, Diversity in the Legal Profession: Moving from
Rhetoric to Reality, 4 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 2-3 (2013) ("Despite being the architects of significant,
positive societal advancement over the last half of the twentieth century, members of the legal community
continue to struggle with the inequality that exists within their own ranks."); Kevin R. Johnson, Bias in
the Legal System? An Essay on the Eligibility of Undocumented Immigrants to Practice Law, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1655, 1658-62 (2013) (summarizing history of exclusion of immigrants and "others" from
the practice of law); Mary Vasaly, Men in Black: Gender Diversity and the Eighth Circuit Bench, 36 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1703, 1703 (2010) ("For most of the history of the legal profession in the United
States, courts were the exclusive domain of 'men in black.'"); David B. Wilkins, From "Separate is
Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is Goodfor Business": The Rise ofMarket-BasedDiversityArguments
and the Fate ofthe Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1560-70 (2004) (summarizing how
the legal profession historically excluded non-white men and women).
93 In response to past critiques, the Chief Justice's appointments to the Committee have become more
geographically varied and have included some variety of practice types (smaller firms, for example).
McCabe, supra note 34, at 1666. Yet, gender and race have not been prioritized.
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of all colors to the Committee; however, this will not happen without the
insistence of the greater judiciary, lawyers, and members of the academy.94
The Committee cannot remediate the inevitable results of the exclusion
of whole categories of individuals overnight, but diversifying membership is
a step in the right direction. White men have had a consistent advantage over
women of all colors and men of color that can only be remedied through
action. 5 A more diverse Committee will have concrete benefits for the
rulemaking process and the rules themselves, and it will contribute to what
should be a professional commitment to correcting the legal profession's
history of excluding so many qualified individuals based on identity alone.
CONCLUSION
#SoWhiteMale should not describe the federal civil rulemaking process
or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the first survey of its kind, this
Essay evaluates the gender and racial compositions of the Rulemaking
Committee over its eighty-year tenure and finds that historically white men
have disproportionately served on the Committee to the exclusion of men of
color and women of all colors. There are also clear disadvantages to
excluding diverse individuals from the Rulemaking Committee. Social
science studies show diverse perspectives can help mollify members'
potential biases, identify details other members may miss, and encourage
deeper thinking about complex problems. While the Committee has made
progress in including white women and men of color in the last few decades,
no women of color have ever been appointed to the Committee, and white
men continue to be appointed in overwhelming numbers.
Moreover, the underrepresentation of men of color and women of all
colors on the Committee reflects the dearth of diverse voices and
perspectives within the legal profession itself. Prioritizing the diversification
of the Rulemaking Committee is a small step in correcting the systematic
exclusion of diverse individuals in the legal profession.
94 While an early House version of the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act included
language requiring that the rules committees have a "balanced cross section of bench and bar, and trial
and appellate judges," that language did not make it into the final version of the bill. Coleman, supra note
7, at 1064. While Congress could similarly amend the Act today, it is not very likely that such an
amendment will take effect. Change is more likely to emerge from less formal action by the judiciary, the
bar, and the academy.
95 David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to Sander,
57 STAN. L. REv. 1915, 1922 (2005) (arguing that "[f]aw schools and legal employers were justified in
taking affirmative steps to assist black students and lawyers in order to counteract the systematic and
pervasive preferences that had been accorded to white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant men of means for more
than one hundred years.").
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The time has come for the Chief Justice to commit to ensuring that the
Rulemaking Committee's racial and gender composition is more
representative. The evidence of imbalance is clear and the action to be taken
is quite simple.9 6 Judges, attorneys, and academics must now demand
change.
96 There are ample resources for determining how best to reduce bias in hiring decisions. See, e.g.,
Rebecca Knight, 7 Practical Ways to Reduce Bias in Your Hiring Process, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 12,
2017) https://hbr.org/20 17/06/7-practical-ways-to-reduce-bias-in-your-hiring-process [https://perma.cc/
8TTW-GALH]; Adam Stites, NFL's Rooney Rule: What Is It and How Does It Work, SB NATION, (Jan.
6, 2018) https://www.sbnation.com/2018/1/6/16856550/rooney-rule-nfl-explained-how-it-works-
coaches [https://perma.cc/TH88-5JUL] (discussing the so-called Rooney Rule which requires all NFL
teams to interview minority candidates when hiring general managers and head coaches). The Chief
Justice and the Administrative Office of the Courts could implement these types of practices when making
appointments. All that it takes is the will to do so.
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